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Abstract
I explore the motivation and logical consequences of the idea that we have
some (limited) ability to know contingent facts about the future, even in
presence of the assumption that the future is objectively unsettled or indeter-
minate. I start by formally characterizing skepticism about the future. This
analysis nudges the anti-skeptic towards the idea that if some propositions
about the future are objectively indeterminate, then it may be indeterminate
whether a suitably positioned agent knows them.
 Introduction
Here are some things I know about my own future. Of a crystal glass that is
dropped from the tenth floor, I know that it will shatter. I know that it will snow
in Chicago next winter; that I will drink some water within the next twelve hours;
that neither my spouse nor I will give birth next month; that Paris will be in France
a year from now. I also know many things about the future that are bolder and
more controversial than these, but will not list them here so as to not distract
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you from my main point. If knowledge has an important role to play within our
understanding of assertion, action, thought, and inquiry, we need to be able to
make sense of the possibility for a non-divine, non-magical intellect to know the
future.
The countervailing thought is that fundamental asymmetries between past
and future might prevent us from knowing contingent propositions that are
entirely about the future (henceforth future contingents). Indeed, the idea that
humans can never know contingent propositions about the future is an intellectual
trope, even independently of any philosophical commitment. Call the position that
rejects knowledge of future contingents future skepticism. Global skeptics—those
who deny that we have any knowledge—are, inter alia, future skeptics. However,
the more interesting kind of future skeptic to be targeted here holds that we have
copious amounts of knowledge about present and past facts, but lack knowledge
of the future altogether.
What kinds of consideration might warrant future skepticism? It is often
mentioned that our knowledge of the future is limited because of the asymmetry
of causation—that is, because causes do not seem to proceed from later to even-
tualities to earlier ones. However, while severely constraining of our ability to
acquire empirical knowledge of the future, the asymmetry of causation does not
justify future skepticism, except for those who are willing to start from extreme
empiricist premises. Even Goldman — a philosopher with strongly naturalistic
views — makes specific room for human foreknowledge by amending his causal
theory of knowledge specifically to allow beliefs about the future to qualify as
knowledge (Goldman, , pp.-). For Goldman, Anna is in a position to
know that the ice cream will melt if there is a common cause (of the right kind)
of both Anna’s belief that the ice cream will melt and of some eventuality that
settles it as true. Setting the specific suggestion aside, the general point is that
the asymmetry of causation is a strong constraint on foreknowledge, but not an
impassable barrier.
More threatening challenges emerge when we reflect on the design of an
interface between a theory of knowledge and a theory of objective chance. It is
widely accepted that knowledge requires truth. It might, however, require more
than that. For example, it might be impossible to know propositions that that have
As I argue in Cariani (, ch.), it is valuable to ask after a naturalistic explanation of how
foreknowledge might be acquired. But we can see the general outlines of how such an explanation
might go. We can know future facts in part by inductive inference, and in part by some kind of
constrained imagined activity that has been independently crucial to counterfactual cognition (see
Kahneman and Tversky, ; Williamson, ; Balcerak Jackson, ; Aronowitz and Lombrozo,
, for some key contributions in this direction).
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low chance. Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio () note that a more sophisticated
version of this constraint is the first step on a path towards future skepticism
(which, like me, they view as undesirable). These challenges do not require
commitment to the idea that the future is any different from the past in either
ontology or structure. That is to say: they arise even for those who believe that
that future contingents are fully bivalent, and that there is no indeterminacy with
regards to which future is ours. All that is needed is the belief that incompatible
propositions about the future may have non-extreme chances.
Though this work at the interface between the theory of chance and the
theory of knowledge is of prime importance, my focus will be on a nearby issue.
I concentrate on challenges that arise when we adopt—even just for the sake of
intellectual exploration—the idea that the future is open. Very roughly, the open
future hypothesis is the claim that future events and states of affair are unsettled,
or indeterminate. This indeterminacy is emphatically not epistemic. It also goes
beyond the claim that multiple ways the future might unfold have positive chance.
The next section expands upon the content of this hypothesis.
My central question is whether proponents of the open future hypothesis
must be future skeptics. At first sight, the answer would appear to have to be
“yes", for reasons broadly related to the factivity of knowledge — the widely
accepted idea that one can only bear the knowledge relation to true propositions.
If knowledge is factive, knowing that the crystal glass will shatter entails the
proposition that the crystal glass will shatter. If this proposition is indeterminate,
it would seem to follow that one cannot know it. I will eventually question
this last step. However, it might seem hard to see how to avoid that step if one
thought it a consequence of the open future that the principle of bivalence for
future contingents fails. Fortunately, as I clarify in section , we can develop an
account of foreknowledge against an attractive metaphysical background which is
compatible with both belief in the open future and endorsement of bivalence.
Once this metaphysical backround is in place, my proposal is that, to stop
the slide from the open future hypothesis to future skepticism, we must entertain
the idea that it might also be indeterminate whether one is in a knowledge state.
For more on this debate, in addition to Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio (), see the reply by
Williamson (Williamson, ). Related puzzles at the interface between the theory of knowledge
and the theory of objective chance are discussed by Dorr et al. (), Goodman and Salow (,
ms.), Stalnaker (, esp, pp. -, ).
For a variety of (incompatible) contributions on the open future, see Łukasiewicz ();
Thomason (); Belnap et al. (); MacFarlane (, ); Hirsch (); Barnes and Cameron
(, ); Torre (); Correia and Iacona (); Cariani and Santorio (); Torrengo and
Iaquinto ().
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Specifically, if it is indeterminate that some future contingent proposition is
true, then it can be indeterminate whether an agent knows that proposition. For
example, if it is indeterminate whether the crystal glass will break, it can be
indeterminate whether I know that it will break.
This paper aims to clarify this view, by investigating the formal contours
of a concept of indeterminate knowledge that is suitable to play this role. After
presenting some background (sections  and ), I consider three ways of arguing for
future skepticism (section ). These three arguments depend on three constraints
on the relation between indeterminacy and knowledge, each of which leads to
future skepticism by means of straightforward (classical) logic. The need to avoid
these constraints nudges us towards entertaining indeterminate knowledge states
(section  and ). Sections  and  expand on some specific issues that arise
once we do entertain them. The final section outlines a standard model theoretic
analysis of the formal principles on the interaction between indeterminacy and
knowledge that are discussed in the course of the paper.
Although I will be theorizing under some version of the open future hypoth-
esis, I am myself neither committed to it, nor to its rejection. I take it as a central
point of methodology that we can make progress by assuming each relevant hy-
pothesis provisionally, exploring the plausibility of its epistemic implications, and
revising our confidence in each hypothesis accordingly.
 Background on the open future hypothesis
It is notoriously controversial how best to characterize the open future hypothesis
(Torre, ). The idea of the open future has historically been associated with a
cluster of metaphysical and semantic theses we should not necessarily take aboard.
Branching. The indeterminacy of the future is well represented by a conception
on which possible worlds overlap and branch (Belnap and Green, ;
Belnap et al., ).
Asymmetric indeterminism. The past is nomically necessary but the future is
not.
Non-bivalence. Future contingent propositions are neither true nor false.
(Łukasiewicz, ; Thomason, ; MacFarlane, )

The first two theses are not directly relevant here (except insofar as they can be
used to argue for the third) and I will set them aside. For the record, I think both
are problematic if understood as characterizations of the openness of the future.
If we are to avoid skepticism, it is absolutely critical however that we reject
the last assumption, for it is one of the main drivers of the slide from belief in the
open future to skepticism. If knowledge requires truth and future contingents are
neither true nor false, then future contingents are unknowable.
I will build my resistance strategy against the background of a cluster of
metaphysical views associated with Barnes and Cameron (, ) and with a
broader stance in support of bivalent indeterminacy. For Barnes and Cameron,
the indeterminacy of the future amounts to the thesis that there are multiple ways
the future might unfold are metaphysically on a par at any given moment — that
nothing settles which of multiple candidates is the actual future. Though this
picture allows for indeterminacy, it divorces the question of indeterminacy from
the question of bivalence. It is determinate that the proposition that the glass will
shatter is either true or false. At the same time, however, that proposition is not
determinately true and not determinately false.
An analogy with certain theories vagueness can help conceptualize this
situation: suppose I am located on the border between Washington DC and
Maryland. It is coherent to describe the situation by saying that I am determinately
either in DC or in Maryland, but not determinately in DC and not determinately
in Maryland. In particular, it seems plausible that I am not located in some third
location that’s neither DC nor Maryland. Adopting a similar stance with respect
to modeling the semantic consequences of the indeterminacy of the future opens
up a path towards a non-skeptical stance. Having registered this analogy, I will
also note that my development depends on assumptions that are distinctive of the
case of the future and do not generalize to problems of vagueness.
 A formal language for indeterminacy and foreknowledge
Let us set up a formal language in which to talk about knowledge and determinacy.
I adopt the convention that roman sans-serif letters (A, B, C) are metalinguistic
For critiques, see Barnes and Cameron (), Cameron (, ch.), Cariani (, section
.).
In addition to Barnes and Cameron, this position is entertained in Hirsch () Cariani and
Santorio (), Cariani (, chs.-). These are not the only attempts to reconcile bivalence
and the openness of the future. There are related approaches within the broad family of “Thin Red
Line” views (Malpass and Wawer, ; Borghini and Torrengo, ; Iacona, ; Torrengo and
Iaquinto, ). These views are not equivalent to the bivalent indeterminist view I adopt in the
paper, but they might also be leveraged to support the present epistemological development.
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variables ranging over sentences of this language. By contrast, bold letters (e.g.
A,B,C) range over propositions, with the further specification that, in context,
I use A to refer to the proposition expressed by sentence A. Quasi-quotation is
implied whenever these metavariables are involved in complex strings, but never
represented.
The primitive grammar of the language is:
A ::= p | ¬A | (A∧A) | KA | DA,
This is a modal language. In particular, that the K and D operators are box-like
modal operators and can embed freely within the language. Disjunction (∨) and
the material conditional (→) are defined as usual — respectively: ¬(¬A∧¬B) and
¬(A∧¬B). We assign to D and K corresponding dual operators — ♦ for D and 
for K . Thus, ♦ captures what is possible in light of the determinate facts, while 
captures what is possible in light of the knowledge encoded in K .
There is an important difference with regard to the temporal anchoring of
these operators. K and model the knowledge state of specific agent at a specific
moment in time. I do not make the same assumption about D and ♦, because we
need these to track determinacy facts dynamically (details to come in sections
 and ). To reflect this difference with terminological distinction, I speak of a
designated moment for K and of a relevant moment for D. Let us illustrate this with
a mixed sentence that will play an important role in the following: ♦KA. To make
this more concrete, suppose that the value of A is the sentence it will rain tomorrow
and the designated moment for K is Monday, while the relevant moment for D is
Tuesday. According to the interpretation strategy I just outlined, ♦KA means that
the determinate facts on Tuesday are compatible with one’s having known A on
Monday. Also according to the same interpretation strategy, the relevant time for
D might change, but the designated time for K does not.
In talking about the possibilities that are tracked by these operators, it is
convenient to bend some standard terminology. Say that D and ♦ quantify over
historical possibilities, while K and  quantify over epistemic possibilities. To say
that it is historically possible that my daughter will lose her front tooth tomorrow
is to say that the determinate facts at the present time do not settle that she will
not lose her front tooth tomorrow. Associating determinacy operators with the
notion of historical possibility signals that the only source of indeterminacy to
As Barnes and Williams (, §) highlight, allowing determinacy operators to embed freely
under other operators makes our analytical task significantly more complicated than if we only
allowed D to occur as the main operator of formulas.
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be considered is the indeterminacy of the future. This usage is not congenial to
those who maintain that the indeterminacy of the future belongs to a broader
conceptual category that includes other kinds of indeterminacy (as suggested in
Barnes and Williams  and also elaborated by Williams , ). Although
I do think that the indeterminacy of the future, I reiterate here that I make these
terminological choices for convenience.
Likewise, my talk of epistemic possibilities differs from the prevalent usage of
the phrase. In particular, the prevalent usage of the phrase “epistemic possibilities”
refers to possibilities that are tracked by natural language epistemic modals such
as the English might. My use of “epistemic possibility” here is technical and it
picks out whatever possibilities we must quantify over in our (Hintikka-style)
model of knowledge. In other words, despite the terminology, the symbol ♦ and
the English might have no interesting semantic connection.
Having started out with a language with two modal operators K , and D, we
can use the latter to define an indeterminacy operator I :
IA := ¬DA & ¬D¬A
A proposition is indeterminate in truth value if and only if neither it nor its
negation are determinate. Given the duality assumption, IA is also equivalent to
¬DA & ♦A (i.e., A is not determinately true but it is historically possible), and
perhaps most perspicuously to ♦¬A & ♦A (both A and its negation are historically
possible).
 Formal correlates of future skepticism
The future skeptic maintains that indeterminacy is a barrier to knowledge. Some
defenders of the open future hypothesis embrace the skeptical connection be-
tween indeterminacy and unknowability. Even Barnes and Cameron were initially
tempted by this position:
[T]he unknowability [of future contingents] on our account is not con-
stitutive of the indeterminacy, but rather a consequence of it. Because
the truth-value of the propositions expressed by presently uttered
future-directed sentences are metaphysically unsettled, such proposi-
tions cannot be known—such propositions have a truth-value, but their
truth-value must remain epistemically inaccessible until the unfolding
of the future settles which truth-value they in fact have (Barnes and
Cameron, , p. ).

Barnes and Cameron revised this stance in §. of Barnes and Cameron (),
where they briefly sketch a view that is very much like the one I develop here.
The present focus, however, is on articulating the skeptical position with
more precision and depth. We want to represent in the formal language the thesis
that no one knows indeterminate propositions. Here is its natural implementation:
Skeptical core. IA→¬KA
Recall that IA unpacks as ♦A & ¬DA. Of these two conjuncts, only the second,
¬DA, is relevant to support the skeptical consequent, ¬KA. In other words, what
matters to our inability to know A is the fact that it is not determinately true.
Though importantly different, the skeptical core fits with the spirit of Field’s
() “rejectionist” analysis of belief in indeterminate contents. Writing with
vagueness as the central case study, Field argues that accepting that a proposition
is indeterminate involves absolute rejection of both it and its negation. These
positions share the idea that indeterminacy is a barrier to certain cognitive stand-
ings, be they knowledge or positive credence. Of course, there are important, and
ultimately irreconciliable differences between these approaches to indeterminacy.
It is important to note some standard ways of deriving the skeptical core
from basic classical logic, together with some additional assumptions. Our first
purported proof is a warm-up:
. |− KA→ A factivity of K
. |− A→¬IA truth-to-determinacy
. |− KA→¬IA , transitivity of→
. |− IA→¬KA , contraposition for→
Open futurists come prepared to this challenge: they must reject the idea that
truth entails determinacy. No indeterminist needs to accept that if the coin lands
heads, then it is determinate that it lands heads.
There is an important choice point concerning how to deny step . A non-
classical approach, leaning on the concept of global validity in supervaluational
semantics (see e.g. see Williamson  ch. , and Varzi ), has it that the argu-
ment with premise A and conclusion ¬IA is valid (i.e. A |− ¬IA), and yet that it does
not follow that A→¬IA is a theorem. In other words, the deduction theorem fails.
The classical alternative would have both the theorem and the premise/conclusion
argument fail. The model theory I present in section  implements this classical

blueprint. However, the non-classical alternative is a well established and in no
way ruled out by anything I say here.
A second purported skeptical proof goes via a different kind of insight. One
might suppose that if it is not determinate which of two worlds is mine, then my
epistemic state cannot distinguish between them. If w and v have exactly the same
history but divergent futures then my epistemic state lacks the discriminatory
capacity to identify one of these worlds as mine. More explicitly, if a possibility is
historically open, I am not in a position to rule it out.
. |− ♦¬A→ ¬A skeptical bridge
. |− IA→ ¬A , antecedent strengthening for→
. |− ¬A→¬KA duality of  and K
. |− IA→¬KA ,, transitivity of→
It is sometimes helpful to restate the skeptical bridge purely in terms of the dual
modals, i.e. as ¬DA→¬KA.
The skeptical bridge bears some resemblance to principles that are the focus
of the literature on knowledge and objective chance. Following Hawthorne and
Lasonen-Aarnio (), the relevant connection is typically forged through some
version of a safety requirement on knowledge. Roughly speaking, the safety
requirement says that one’s knowing A in w requires that A be true at all the
closest worlds in which one believes it. In this kind of framework, a close analogue
to the skeptical bridge might say that historical possibilities are always close in
the sense that is relevant for safety.
A third type of proof relies on the principle that knowledge is always de-
terminate. This is explicitly posited by Belnap et al. () who say “when we
have knowledge, it is settled true that we have it” (p. ). Since their concept of
settled truth is close to the present concept of determinacy, this thought can be
approximately represented by the principle that KA→DKA. This principle also
entails the skeptical core.
. |− KA→DKA determinacy of knowledge
. |− KA→ A axiom T for K
. |−D(KA→ A) , necessitation for D (in LKD)
. |−DKA→DA , axiom K for D + modus ponens rule

. |− KA→DA ,, transitivity of→
. |− ¬DA→¬KA , contraposition for→
. |− IA→¬KA , antecedent strengthening for→
These proofs might not convince an anti-skeptic, but they demarcate boundaries
within which an anti-skeptic open-futurist must operate.
The skeptical bridge and the determinacy of knowledge are tightly related.
The determinacy of knowledge entails the skeptical bridge. In section , with a
model theory in hand, we will be able to see that the entailment is not symmetric
absent any other assumptions. However, it can be strengthened to equivalence by
assuming other principles. For example, the KK principle would suffice for this
task.
Before I get to what that positive view must look like, it is important to take
note of a slight strengthening of the skeptical core. This is the principle:
Strengthened core. IA→¬♦KA
The difference between the skeptical core and its strengthening is somewhat subtle.
If we think in terms of possible worlds, we can put the difference as follows. The
core says that A’s indeterminacy in w is incompatible with A being known in
w. The strengthening says that A’s indeterminacy in w is incompatible A’s being
known in w and also in any world other world that is exactly like w as far as the
determinate facts go.
Within a standard relational possible world semantics (see again section ),
the core does not entail its strengthening. Figure  shows a countermodel: ¬Dp
is true at w and so is ¬Kp. However, at that world it is historically possible that
one is in v, where p is determinate and known. These countermodels can be
ruled out by stipulating that the relation underlying D is Euclidean (i.e., whenever
wRDv & wRDz, we must have vRDz). Thus the core and its strengthening are
equivalent modulo the axiom that characterizes the class of Euclidean frames
(¬DA→D¬DA).
Here is a proof sketch. If K is factive, |− KA→ A. Since D is a normal modal operator, satisfying
the necessitation rule and axiom K, |− DKA → DA. Chaining this with |− KA → DKA, we get
|− KA → DA. By contraposition |− ¬DA → ¬KA which after appropriate substitutions based on
duality principles yields |− ♦¬A→ ¬A.
Contraposing the skeptical bridge and using duality, we get KA→DA. Consider the class of
instances of this principle in which A is replaced with KA to get KKA→DKA. If KK holds, we have
KA→ KKA, which can be chained with that last principle to yield, KA→DKA.
Start with ¬DA→ ¬KA. If this is a theorem, so is its necessitated version D(¬DA→ ¬KA).
Distributing D across the conditional yields D¬DA→D¬KA, i.e., D¬DA→¬♦KA. Chaining axiom
with this theorem yields the strengthened core. If one accepts the standard relational model theory
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Figure : The gap
Another way to derive the strengthened core is by accepting appropriate
strengthenings of the principles deployed in earlier proofs, in particular:
Strengthened bridge. ¬DA→¬♦KA
Strengthened determinacy of knowledge. ♦KA→DKA
Although there is logical daylight between the core and its strengthening,
there is little reason for the skeptic to go for the core but reject the strengthening.
For one thing, many conceive of the indeterminacy of the future so as to support
the Euclidean property for RD . More importantly, however, the view that accepts
the core but denies the strengthening is only viable as a strange mix of skeptical
and anti-skeptical features. It deviates from full-on skepticism by imagining that
is never known in any world in which it is not determinately true. However, it is
known in some worlds that count as historical possibility from the perspective
of the base world. This mix of skepticism and anti-skepticism is not any kind of
middle ground. It is just satisfactory no one. For this reason, I take the stable
skeptical position to be committed to the stronger principles.
 The anti-skeptical baseline
The need to reject the determinacy of knowledge points to an approach that allows
us to avoid skepticism while retaining a broadly open-futurist framework. Short
of denying some of the classical assumptions involved in the third proof, the
only path for an anti-skeptical open futurist is is to entertain the idea that it can
sometimes be indeterminate whether one is in a knowledge state with respect to
an indeterminate proposition.
In Cariani (, ch. -), I consider an analogous approach to related
problems about assertion. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that assertion is
subject to a truth norm—one may assert A only if A is true. The assertion analogue
of skepticism is the view that if it is indeterminate a proposition is true, then
that proposition is determinately not assertible (MacFarlane, , ch. ). The

problem with this position is that intuitively we are in a position to make a great
many perfectly legitimate assertions about the future. Instead of rejecting the
whole class of future contingents as unassertible, it is more plausible to adopt a
more permissive position, according to which it is itself indeterminate whether
the truth norm is met by assertions of indeterminate propositions. The structural
point is that indeterminacy in whether some factual requirement is met lifts up
to indeterminacy of normative statuses that depend on that factual requirement
being met. For parallel reasons, I claim, indeterminacy of truth may sometimes
result in indeterminacy of knowledge.
But in what sense does appeal to indeterminate knowledge states get us out of
skeptical danger? Addressing this concern requires identifying some relevant ways
in which indeterminate knowledge states are different from states of determinate
ignorance.
The most distinctive aspect of the indeterminacy posited by open future
theorists is that the cloud of indeterminacy shrinks as we progress through time.
Here are Barnes and Cameron making just this point:
[W]e hold that whilst future contingents have no determinate truth-
value, they are, determinately, either true or false. Furthermore, we
hold that the truth-value they have can be revealed as time progresses
and events unfold. So suppose on Friday you make a prediction: ‘Aliens
will invade tomorrow’. Your utterance lacks a determinate truth-value.
But come Saturday, when aliens are mercifully absent, you can look
back and say that your prediction was false. (Barnes and Cameron,
, p. )
This dynamic nature seems uniquely specific to the indeterminacy of the future.
It is not shared by other varieties of indeterminacy that are invoked to understand
vagueness and most varieties of paradox.
Let us illustrate it with a specific example. Suppose that on Monday, the
historically possible worlds OM are agnostic about the weather on Tuesday. Then,
on Tuesday, it snows. At that point, the set of historically possible worlds gets
trimmed down to OT ⊂OM consisting of all the worlds that share the history up to
Monday, but additionally feature snow on Tuesday. Let A be some sentence stating
in our object language the claim that it snows on Tuesday. Then A might go from
See Besson and Hattiangadi () and (Cariani, , ch.). In addition, Cariani () and
(Cariani, , ch.) argue against the idea that there are no future-directed assertions. According
to these are views, we perform speech acts of prediction that are subject to different standards than
ordinary assertion. Against this, I argue that most predictions in fact are assertions.

indeterminate on Monday, to determinate on Tuesday and thereafter (as shown in
Figure ). It is this dynamic element distinguishes the indeterminacy of the open







Figure : Dynamic indeterminacy
To illustrate how knowledge interacts with this indeterminacy let us make a
simplifying assumption. Assume that there is a state a thinker can be in, which is
just like the state of knowing A minus the truth of A. Call this state pre-knowledge
of A. We may well doubt that such a state exists, for reasons roughly related to
Williamson’s (, ch. , ) critique of attempts to factorize knowledge in internal
and external components. However, I do not suggest taking this concept all that
seriously: we just help ourselves to it for illustration’s sake. Moreover, there are
some nearby states whose existence we have no reason to doubt, such as historically
possible knowledge (what would be expressed by ♦K) and epistemically possible
knowledge (corresponding to K).
Suppose that on Monday one pre-knows A but A is indeterminate (OM * A
and OM * A); then it is indeterminate on Monday whether one knows A. On
Tuesday A is no longer indeterminate (OT ⊆A). Here is the central thought: from
Tuesday’s perspective, it is determinate that I did know (on Monday) that it would
snow (on Tuesday). It is important that this analysis need not involve commitment
to semantic relativism about future contingents (or about determinacy claims) in
the style of MacFarlane (, ), though it is compatible with it.
This dynamic component is absent from states of determinate ignorance. If
on Monday it is determinately the case that I am ignorant about Tuesday’s weather,
there is no possible future development in which my Monday state can correctly
be described as knowledge. What is possible, of course, is that on Tuesday I occupy
In fact, it is not clear whether Williamson’s arguments rule out the possibility of pre-knowledge
— that is of a state that is just like knowledge except for the truth of the matter, especially against a
background that allows for indeterminate truth. Strictly speaking Williamson argues that there is
no sharp way of separating internal conditions involved in knowledge from external ones. In other
words, that there is no pure inner “factor” of knowledge. But this is compatible with knowledge
involving some mix of internal conditions, some purely external conditions (such as truth), and
some ‘prime’ conditions.
For discussion of these principles, and proposals to think of epistemically possible knowledge
as providing account of justification, see Stalnaker (, ); Bird (); Ichikawa (); Carter
and Goldstein ().

a new state which counts as knowledge that it is snowing on Tuesday. But that is
hardly news and hardly of relevance to a debate with the future skeptic.
An important question is how much of the work that we need human fore-
knowledge to do can be done by appealing to states of indeterminate knowledge.
In my view, dynamically evolving states of indeterminate knowledge would allow
us to avoid many pernicious consequences of future skepticism.
Let me illustrate by considering the role that knowledge plays in discourse.
According to a widespread (but by no means universally accepted) view, assertions
are governed by a knowledge norm: there is something defective about asserting
A when one does not know A. Suppose that on Monday I asserted the propo-
sition that it will snow on Tuesday. Suppose again that my state on Monday is
pre-knowledge of that proposition and that the proposition is indeterminate in
truth-value. Then it is indeterminate whether I know what I asserted, and thus
indeterminate whether I have met the norm of assertion. That indeterminacy
however is not sufficient to warrant the claim that my assertion is defective in the
ways that assertions that determinately violate a norm are. Indeed on Tuesday, as
the indeterminacy is resolved, it is determinate that I knew that it would snow,
and thus that my Monday assertion did meet the knowledge norm of assertion.
 Lifting principles
It would be nice to have a principle that captures the connection between indeter-
minacy and knowledge. For obvious reasons, that principle cannot be:
Unrestricted lift. IA→ IK(A)
Indeterminacy only lifts in this way when one is in the right mental state towards
a proposition. In our colorful but non-serious language, indeterminacy in the
truth-value of A only lifts when one pre-knows A. After all, if indeterminacy
alone were sufficient for lifting, there would be no contingent propositions about
the future of which any one of us is determinately ignorant, and instead there are
plenty.
To patch this problem with the unrestricted lift without explicitly appealing
to pre-knowledge states in our official theory, we stipulate:
Williamson () is often associated with this idea, but Williamson adds in the idea that this
norm is constitutive of the speech act of assertion. A much larger swath of theorists would accept the
weaker claim that knowledge is a normative requirement of non-defective assertions. Indeed, this is
plausibly a consequence of Grice’s () Maxim of Quality.

Restricted lift. ♦KA→ (IA→ IKA)
The proposal is that indeterminacy lifts whenever the settled facts up to the
designated time leave open whether I know A.
Under basic assumptions, the restricted lift follows from the standard way of
combining the logics of knowledge and indeterminacy. In particular, suppose that
the isolated logics of knowledge and determinacy are normal modal logics. More
precisely, suppose that LK ⊆ L is the modal language with K as its only operator
and LD ⊆ L is the modal language with D as its only operator. Next, say that the
isolated logic of K (call it ‘LK’) and the isolated logic of D (call it ‘LD’) are both
normal modal logics in their respective languages. The fusion of two normal modal
logics is ordinarily defined as the smallest normal modal logic that extends both
(Kurucz, ; Carnielli and Coniglio, ).
There are some important facts to be highlighted about the fusion LKD of
LK and LD. These facts do not depend on the strength of the isolated logics. (To
substantiate this point, I will generally work with whichever logic makes the task
at hand harder.) A first observation is that the skeptical principles from section
 are not theorems of LKD. That is, the skeptical core, IA→¬KA, the skeptical
bridge, ♦¬A → ¬A, and the determinacy of knowledge, KA → DKA, are not
theorems of LKD, even if the isolated logics LK and LD are each taken to be as
strong as S5. For now, I state these claims without proof, but a proof is implied
in the model theoretic characterizations of section . By contrast, the restricted
lift, ♦KA→ (IA→ IKA), is a theorem of LKD, even if the isolated logics are each
as weak as K.
It is somewhat surprising that the restricted lift is valid in LKD, because
logical fusion is largely neutral on the choice between skeptical and non-skeptical
approaches. The key to understand this fact is to note that the restricted lift is
endorsed by the skeptic as merely trivially valid. Recall the strengthened skeptical
To see why the restricted lift is a theorem of LKD, start by recalling that IA unpacks to
♦A & ¬DA. In particular, the consequent of the restricted lift, IKA, unpacks to ♦KA & ¬DKA. The
first conjunct of ♦KA & ¬DKA can be proven directly from the assumption ♦KA — which formula
is one of the antecedents in the restricted lift. In light of that, the restricted lift is established as
soon as we have:
(i) IA→¬DKA
In turn, (i) follows from a basic theorem of the fusion logic LKD:
(ii) ¬DA→¬DKA
This is a theorem in the combined logic since KA→ A is a theorem of LK and thus a theorem of
LKD. By necessitation, |−D(KA→ A) which after trivial manipulations entails (ii).

core: IA → ¬♦KA. Given this, the antecedent of the outer conditional of the
restricted lift, ♦KA, is incompatible with the antecedent of the inner conditional,
IA. The local upshot is that the skeptic’s endorsement of the validity of the
restricted lift has nothing to do with endorsing indeterminate knowledge as a
genuine possibility.
The broader upshot is that, although the restricted lift is a natural expression
of a view that the antiskeptic endorses, it would be incorrect to suppose that it
characterizes the antiskeptical position. In fact, I conjecture that in this language
there is no way of characterizing the anti-skeptical position in terms of the validity
of any one statement. As a result of these considerations, it is best to view
the dispute between the skeptic and their opponent as entirely centering on the
former’s acceptance of the skeptical core (and its cognates) and the latter’s rejection
of these validities, coupled with some claim to the effect that the restricted lift is
taken by the anti-skeptic to be non-trivially valid.
 Indeterminacy and the unidirectionality of knowledge
We saw that future skeptics are committed to principles that exceed the fusion of
the isolated logics of determinacy and knowledge. As it turns out, those who want
to avoid future skepticism also face important choice points that require enriching
the fusion logic. In this section, I take up one such example, first by presenting an
informal idea and then by matching it with a formal constraint.
The question to be considered involves constraints on the distribution of
indeterminate knowledge states across partitions of future possibilities. Suppose I
buy Linne a gift. When she gets it, she will be happy, sad, indifferent, or undecided.
These are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of the future possibilities. Notate the
partition corresponding to Linne’s responses as {A1,A2,A3,A4}. In such a situation,
we may wonder whether it is possible for one to have indeterminate knowledge of
two or more of the Ai ’s. That is, we’d like to know if there are x and y such that:
IKAx & IKAy
There is good reason to rule this out and adopt instead the view that the kind of
indeterminate knowledge of interest here is by and large unidirectional. That is to
say, with a small class of possible exceptions to be considered shortly, an ordinary
We could get around this problem if our language had propositional quantification. In that
setting we could directly express the claim that there are propositions that are indeterminately
known. I do not pursue the complications involved with this move here.

human agent cannot indeterminately know a proposition and also indeterminately
know another, incompatible proposition.
One motivating intuition for unidirectionality might involve the idea that
indeterminately knowing A is a state that is as similar as possible to knowing A,
except for the unsettled truth status of the proposition. And just as one cannot
know incompatible propositions, one cannot indeterminately know incompatible
propositions.
One way of building on these points is to reflect on consistency constraints
on potential requirements of knowledge — e.g. on justification. Suppose one
believes that Linne will be sad and also believes that she will be indifferent (recall
that we are assuming these states are incompatible). There is some plausibility
to the thought that those contradictory beliefs generate a conflict that would
strike down at least one, if not both, of the beliefs from counting as justified, and
thus as, if justification is required for knowledge. The fact that they are logically
incompatible suggests that, for each belief, one accepts a proposition that defeats
it. If both defeaters have equal strength, then both knowledge items have been
defeated. In the alternate case in which one of the defeaters should be prioritized
over the other, it still determinate that one does not know both Ax and Ay .
Not everyone will find this argument persuasive. To start, there is conceptual
daylight between accepting a proposition that could count as defeater for a belief,
and having the belief be defeated. Perhaps one’s belief is defeated only if one is
aware of the defeat relation. For a related theoretical point, considerations related
to the preface paradox (as well as other paradoxical scenarios) convince some
theorists that there can be simultaneous justification for beliefs in incompatible
contents. This is not the place to explore, much less resolve, this dialectic. I
just draw the moral that some might find unidirectionality attractive because
of consistency requirements on justification, while others might not. Should
this defense of unidirectionality were to fail, there are other paths to supporting
unidirectionality of indeterminate knowledge. In particular, we might sign up for a
safety-based or normality-based account of knowledge (in the style of Smith ;
Goodman and Salow , ms.; Carter and Goldstein ). It seems plausible
to ground the unidirectionality of knowledge in the unidirectionality of certain
important normality relations.
Foley () denies consistency constraints on justification. For other defenses of the idea that
there can be justified or rational inconsistency, see Christensen (); Worsnip (); Littlejohn
and Dutant (); Staffel (). On the other side, Neta () responds to Worsnip’s argument.
For examples of accounts that support such consistency constraints, see Pollock and Cruz ();
Smith (). Also, the analyses of justification in terms of knowledge mentioned in footnote 
generally support consistency constraints.

There is another limit to my argument for the unidirectionality of indetermi-
nate knowledge. The argument — and in fact the principle of unidirectionality
itself — might fail, unless we assume in the background that the only relevant
source of indeterminacy is the truth status of the relevant propositions. Some
philosophers working on vagueness and paradox (Dorr, ; Barnett, ; Caie,
) allow that one might sometimes be in a state of indeterminate belief. Sup-
pose one can be in a state of indeterminate belief towards the proposition that
Linne will be happy (A1) and in a state of indeterminate belief towards the propo-
sition that she will be sad (A2). This might hold while it is determinate that I have
exactly one relevant belief. It seems coherent to enrich this picture by imagining
that there is one resolution of the indeterminacy on which A1 is true, believed
and known, and a second resolution of the indeterminacy on which A2 is true,
belied and known. Such a situation might allow multi-directional indeterminate
knowledge via multi-directional indeterminate belief. That is, it would allow that
it is determinate that I know one of the Ai ’s but indeterminate which.
This suggests that unidirectionality might need to be restricted. After all,
if one entertains the possibility of indeterminate beliefs, one entertains the pos-
sibility of indeterminate beliefs about the future. This is no refutation of the
principle of unidirectionality, since we can restrict it to determinate beliefs. So
revised, it states that, as long as we assume that all the relevant states of beliefs are
determinate, then states of indeterminate knowledge ought to be unidirectional.
This restriction would be problematic if it trimmed out something of present
interest, and in particular if there was a reason to assume that the indeterminacy
of the future should by itself (that is: independently of vagueness or paradox) lead
us to entertain indeterminate belief states. But there is no reason to assume that.
Our state of belief in non-vague, non-paradoxical future contents do not seem to
be relevantly different from similar states of belief in non-vague, non-paradoxical
contents that are about the past and the present. The intuitive pull one feels
towards appealing to indeterminate belief for vague contents is completely absent
when it comes to the indeterminacy of the future.
This discussion allows us to go on a brief but interesting detour on the philosophical signifi-
cance of unidirectionality. The unidirectionality principle is important for distinguishing human
foreknowledge from the kind of foreknowledge one might consider assigning to an omniscient being
(e.g. to the God of the Abrahamic religions). More specifically, Todd and Rabern () explore (and
ultimately reject) the idea that we might make sense of divine omniscience in terms of a concept
of indeterminate knowledge. However, in the context of the debate on divine foreknowledge, it is
very important that indeterminate knowledge be omnidirectional. That is, if Π is a partition of the
historical possibilities, one would need it to be the case that for each A ∈Π, God indeterminately
knows A. The reason to appeal to indeterminate knowledge stems from a desire to square the idea
of an open future with the idea that God is omniscient. After all, if it is objectively indeterminate

The natural implementation of unidirectionality in our formal setup is in
terms of the following principle.
Unidirectionality. (IKA & IKB)→ ♦(A & B)
Informally: one can have indeterminate knowledge towards two propositions A
and B only when it is historically possible for both A and B to hold. If we wanted
to restrict this principle, so that it only holds under the assumption of determinate
belief, we could consider expanding the formal language by adding belief operators
and restricting the principle to those cases in which one determinately believes
the two propositions. Unidirectionality does not follow from the mere fusion
of LK and LD (This will be proven in section ). In fact, unidirectionality is a
paradigm example of a substantive principle that needs to be added on to flesh
out the anti-skeptical open futurist’s world view.
 Indeterminate knowledge and inference
Once we grant that our state towards some future contingent propositions is
indeterminate knowledge, a question arises as to whether it is possible to be in
this state towards a determinate truth. Suppose in particular that one infers
a determinate truth C from a premise A which is not determinately true and
not determinately false. Suppose that the state one is in towards A qualifies as
indeterminate knowledge. What should we say about the status of one’s belief
towards C in such a situation?
It is tempting to say that beliefs that are based entirely on beliefs in proposi-
tions that are indeterminate in truth value cannot rise to the status of determinate
knowledge. Moreover, it is tempting to think that inference from indeterminately
known propositions must itself result in indeterminate knowledge — even when
the inferred proposition is determinate. Such temptations must, you guessed it,
be resisted. It is true that in some cases one may be in a state of indeterminate
knowledge towards a proposition that is determinately true. But in others, one
may simply acquire determinate knowledge on the basis of inference from propo-
sitions of which one merely has indeterminate knowledge. Let me illustrate both
possibilities.
that it will be sunny tomorrow, God cannot determinately know that it will be sunny. But God
cannot determinately fail to know it either, for that would completely undermine omniscience. The
alternative would be to describe God as indeterminately knowing each one of the relevant open
historical possibilities. And the key difference is that, according to this picture, God would have to
be understood as indeterminately believing each of those propositions.
Of course adding the axiom is also open to the skeptic, in the same trivializing sense in which
the skeptic accepts the lifting principles.

Start with a case in which it is unproblematic to describe an agent as having
indeterminate knowledge in a determinate truth. As a background, note that, even
if we deny any kind of reductive analysis, it is plausible that knowledge may be
linked to various kinds of necessary conditions. The exact list of these conditions
does not matter, but let us say for the sake of illustration that they include belief,
safety and truth. The important observation is that indeterminacy may affect any
one of these requirements.
It helps to reflect on the structure of a scenario in which it is indeterminate
whether one’s belief is safe. To construct this structure, suppose (i) I determinately
believe both A and C, and in particular I believe C only on the basis of inference
from A (ii) A is indeterminate and indeterminately known; (iii) C is determinately
true, and (iv) for both beliefs it is indeterminate whether they are safe. This type
of scenario illustrates that as a matter of principle, there is nothing surprising in
the idea that one may indeterminately know a determinate truth. Moreover, the
possibility that safety might be indeterminate is not entirely far fetched. After
all, the safety constraint is spelled out in terms of a notion of modal closeness
and, in the nearby counterfactuals literature, Stalnaker has famously argued that
the closeness relation that matters to counterfactuals is sometimes indeterminate
(Stalnaker, ).
Next consider some equally harmless scenarios in which one acquires items
of determinate knowledge from states of indeterminate knowledge. Some authors
have pointed to the possibility of acquiring knowledge on the basis of inference
from false beliefs (Warfield, ; Fitelson, ). Here is a version of Warfield’s
core case: I look at my watch, it says that it is :; on the basis of that, I form
the belief that it is :; from that belief, I infer that I am on time for my 
PM appointment. However, unbeknownst to me, my watch is a minute fast,
and it is . My belief that it is : is not knowledge, because it is not true, but
plausibly my belief that I am on time for my appointment is. Cases of inferring
a determinate truth from an indeterminate premise may have this same general
structure. Imagine this scenario: I determinately believe and indeterminately
know that it will rain; I infer from that belief that it will rain that I will need boots
to be comfortable; however, that inferred belief is determinately true, because it is
determinately true that it will either rain or snow tomorrow. The idea that this
is possible is strictly less spooky than the already merely mildly spooky idea of
inferring knowledge from falsehood.

 The classical modal analysis
To conclude, let us explore a model theoretic analysis of the logical points I
have made along the way. One of the most prominent models of indeterminacy,
roughly codified in Barnes and Williams () and applied to the open future
in Barnes and Cameron (, ) is precisificationist. According to this model,
indeterminacy in what world is actual is to be understood in terms of there being
multiple, incompatible, and fully precise representations, each of which has equal
claim to accurately represent our reality. The proposal is avowedly non-reductivist
about the relevant sort of indeterminacy: “having equal claim” is just a matter of
it being unsettled which fully precise representation is correct. One of the main
points of emphasis for this view is that indeterminacy does not show up in the
basic semantic analysis of the relevant fragment of language, which is otherwise
endowed with a thoroughly classical logic.
It is possible to complement this proposal with a classical model theory for a
multi-modal logic. The key philosophical application for this model theory is
that it will help us pin down some non-entailment relations which we have only
been able to gesture at.
Recall that, given a normal modal logic for K and a normal modal logic for
D, the fusion LKD of the logics is the smallest modal logic that extends both. Its
model theoretic characterization, for our language, is provided by models of the
following form:
Definition  A fusion model is a structure 〈W,RK ,RD ,v〉 such that W is a set of
worlds, RK and RD are respectively the accessibility relations for K and D, and v is a
valuation function.
Relative to fusion models we give the straightforward semantics
I. for each atomic sentence A,M,w |= A iff vM(A,w) = 1
II. for any sentences A, B:
– M,w |= A & B iffM,w |= A andM,w |= B
By developing the classical model theory, I do not mean to rule out the possibility or interest
of a non-classical analysis for the modals that retains classical logic for the non-modal part of
the language. Indeed, I think there is promise in leveraging Humberstone’s possibility semantics
(Humberstone, ) to generate an alternate non-precisificationist model of the indeterminacy of
the future. But this is a line of analysis that presents unique technical and conceptual problems
and needs to be argued for and developed separately. Moreover, for the purposes of analyzing our
principles, the classical approach will suffice.

– M,w |= A∨B iffM,w |= A orM,w |= B
– M,w |= ¬A iffM,w 6|= A
III. for any A,
– M,w |= DA iff for all u, wRDu,M,u |= A
– M,w |= KA iff for all u, wRKu,M,u |= A
The logic generated by fusion models (given appropriate constraints on RK and
RD) is the logic is generated by the union of the axioms of the individual logics
(Carnielli and Coniglio, , §.) . This is not the same as the union of the
logics, since for instance ¬DA→¬DKA is not a theorem of either logic but it is a
theorem of the fusion.
In the course of the above discussion, I noted three principles that need to be
added to the fusion, These can now be given precise model-theoretic treatment.
Fact  The skeptical bridge (♦A→ A, or equivalently ¬DA→¬KA) is not valid over
the class of all fusion frames. This principle is characterized are by the frame condition:
∀x,y(xRDy→ xRKy)
Fact  The determinacy of knowledge (KA→ DKA) is not valid over the class of all
fusion frames. It is characterized by the frame condition:
∀x,y((xRDy)→∀z(yRKz→ xRKz))
Fact  The unidirectionality of indeterminate knowledge (IKA & IKB→ ♦(A & B))
is not valid over the class of all fusion frames. It is characterized over these frames by
the condition:
∀x,y,z(xRDy & xRDz→∃w(yRKw & zRKw & xRDw))
Proofs of these facts are routine checks with respect to the relevant class of
frames.
These simple technical results illuminate the structure that skeptical and
non-skeptical stances impose on the relationship between epistemic and historical
possibilities. Less formally, the skeptical bridge corresponds to the claim that
historical possibilities are epistemic possibilities; the determinacy of knowledge
At the time of this writing, these can be verified by computer by running the SQEMA algorithm
for described in Conradie et al. () and implemented at https://store.fmi.uni-sofia.bg/
fmi/logic/sqema/sqema_gwt__/index.html.

corresponds to the claim that any two historical possibilities must be related to
the same epistemic possibilities. Finally, the unidirectionality of indeterminate
knowledge corresponds to the claim that any two historical possibilities must
access a common epistemic possibility.
Reflecting on the frame conditions in Facts - helps fully pin down the
relationships between the principles. The skeptical bridge follows from the deter-
minacy of knowledge only on the basis of reflexivity of RK (just consider y = z and
notice that reflexivity yields yRKy). The converse entailment follows only on the
controversial assumption that RK is transitive. This is the semantic correlate of
the KK principle, which as we noted in footnote  can be used to establish this en-
tailment. The frame condition for unidirectionality follows from the skeptical core
as well, provided RK is Euclidean. Of course it can also be imposed independently
of the skeptical core principle, since it does not itself entail any of the skeptical
principles.
Finally, the model theoretic analysis can also help illustrate the dynamics of
indeterminate knowledge as discussed in section . Focus on the relation RD that
tracks the historical possibilities. The thought is that RD is not a static relation
but one that evolves over time.
Assume for simplicity that RD is an equivalence relation, and thus that the
cells it generates are partitions. As I mentioned, this is a controversial assumption
in the indeterminacy literature, but seems plausible in the case of the open futurist
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Figure : Monday’s state
By the skeptical core condition xRDy gets us xRKy; yRKz and transitivity we get xRKz. If
transitivity fails, it is easy to provide a countermodel.

Suppose that A is true at v and u but false at w and consider the specific perspective
of world v. We haveM,v |= IA and cruciallyM,v |= IKA. (This is becauseM,v |=
KA while the historically possible world w hasM,w |= ¬KA.)
Imagine now that between Monday and Tuesday we learn the proposition
corresponding to the set {v,u} and consider Tuesday’s perspective. Recall that, even
though we are considering Tuesday’s determinacy statuses, we are still interested in
how those determinacy facts affects the determinacy status of Monday’s knowledge
states. The upshot of this is that the relation RK is not allowed to change between
the two states of the model, while we assume instead that the accessibility relation
RD has evolved. The historical possibilities at v now only include u in addition to
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Figure : Tuesday state
This models the the sense in which on Tuesday it becomes determinate that
on Monday one determinately knew A. The implied general picture is one on
which for time-fixed K we consider a series of models with D-accessibility relations
that are nested, in the sense that, as the series, progresses “later” partitions are
included in “earlier” partitions.
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